This article argues that the Indian philosopher-mystic Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) espoused a sophisticated form of cosmopsychism that has great contemporary relevance. Deleuze’s philosophy of experience likewise seeks such a movement outside oneself, which we see in his use of Ferlinghetti’s “fourth person singular ” yet, Deleuze’s notion of a Peircian “Zerothness” makes it evident that, unlike Patočka, he does not locate personhood at the basis of experience but rather has in mind a particular sort of impersonal panexperientialism. What an examination of immediate experience uncovers rather than a transcendental subjectivity is instead a “thrust” into the world around us. In brief, Patočka holds that subjectivity is not a phenomenal given and thus is not to be of primary concern when doing phenomenology. To this end, we first study Patočka’s reasons for going against Husserl and reorienting phenomenological studies away from an egoic subjectivity. Thus, we wonder if an impersonal, asubjective phenomenology is possible, which might include Deleuze’s views. What we find is that Deleuze differs from Patočka in one important respect, namely, that Patočka’s philosophy of experience is personal while Deleuze’s is impersonal. This opens the possibility of reevaluating Deleuze’s philosophy of experience to see the extent to which it might be considered an asubjective phenomenology. Yet, as Patočka argues, phenomenology should, in fact, be asubjective in the first place. The asubjective, impersonal nature of Deleuze’s philosophy is one reason it is often considered to be anti-phenomenological. Rather than attempting to broaden psychology by adding metaphysics, an open scientific naturalism can make it more inclusive and more scientific by disputing metaphysically based disbeliefs based on specifically Western background reality assumptions. However, the fact that these are unavoidable does not justify the insertion of foreground metaphysical explanations for psychological or spiritual phenomena. Since it is necessary for science to assume some kind of world within which it is possible to do science, and not every aspect of that assumed world can be subjected to processes of empirical investigation, some of these necessary background assumptions are unavoidably metaphysical. This builds on the nascent open naturalism evidenced in the early years of transpersonal psychology, before it entered its metaphysical phase (ca. A number of scholars well known within transpersonal psychology appear to be converging on open scientific naturalism as a philosophically and methodologically fruitful framework for transpersonal and related fields.
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